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Pointing Guns
Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles, and
Darrell A.H. Miller*
The American gun debate is increasingly populated with scenes of people
pointing and otherwise displaying guns. What is the legal regime governing gun
displays, and how well can it address the distinct social and legal problems they
pose? In this Essay, we argue that the current structure of criminal law does not
supply clear rules of conduct sufficient to avoid the negative effects of gun
displays, and that the rhetorical and expressive effects of Second Amendment
debates threaten to make the situation worse. We also suggest how the legal rules
might be improved, and how battles over norms—as much as criminal
prohibitions and defenses—will continue to shape both social practice and law
when it comes to displays of firearms in public and towards other persons.

Introduction
Threatening displays of guns in the United States appear to be on the
rise in 2020. A man wearing a protective mask to guard against COVID-19
confronts an unmasked shopper in a Walmart in Royal Palm Beach, Florida,
and they argue about masking in the store.1 The unmasked man pulls a
handgun out of his waistband and points it at the other shopper, who says the
armed man threatened his life. Police investigate and, ten days later, charge
the armed man with aggravated assault.2 Prosecutors later drop the charges,
stating that “all legally required elements of the crime” cannot be proven.3
A dispute in a Chipotle parking lot in Orion Township, Michigan, flares
when a white couple backs out of a parking space as a black family is walking
behind the vehicle.4 The female passenger pulls out a handgun as the
* Faculty, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Kim Ferzan for helpful comments on a draft.
1. Kristina Webb, Man Arrested After Pulling Gun in Mask Argument at Royal
Palm Beach Walmart, PALM BEACH POST (July 23, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www
.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/coronavirus/2020/07/23/man-arrested-after-pulling-gun-in-maskargument-at-royal-palm-beach-walmart/112345530 [https://perma.cc/UP4A-JXCY].
2. Austen Erblat, Shopper Charged with Pulling Gun in Walmart During Mask Dispute Posts
$15,000 Bond, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (July 24, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com
/news/crime/fl-ne-walmart-gun-mask-arrested-charged-20200723-tma2ajnkoraodlhjcuqt2szcaastory.html [https://perma.cc/N6Z8-F4MM].
3. Wayne K. Roustan & Austen Erblat, No Charges for Shopper Who Pulled a Gun in Walmart
Mask Dispute, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 1, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com
/local/palm-beach/fl-ne-walmart-gun-charges-dropped-20200901-dkkknwn5mbdtlkbd75fg46tjwestory.html [https://perma.cc/HL7Z-LFJD].
4. Jasmin Barmore & Sarah Rahal, Two Arraigned After Gun Drawn over Bump at Orion Twp.
Chipotle, DET. NEWS (July 3, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local
/oakland-county/2020/07/02/woman-pulls-gun-orion-township-michigan/5365854002/
[https://
perma.cc/7AZN-T35S].
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argument escalates. She and her companion are charged with felonious
assault.
A white St. Louis couple standing in their front yard display a semiautomatic rifle and point a handgun at demonstrators protesting police use of
force as the crowd moves along the road and sidewalk in front of their house.5
The local prosecutor charges them with felony exhibition of a weapon. The
President of the United States calls the criminal investigation “a disgrace,”
the Attorney General of Missouri inserts himself into the litigation with an
extraordinary amicus brief arguing that the charges chill gun rights and
should be dismissed, and the Governor of Missouri announces that he will
pardon the couple if they are convicted of a crime.6
Demonstrators clad in quasi-military gear and openly carrying sidearms
and semi-automatic rifles appear on the streets in cities and towns across the
nation. The spectacles range from heavily armed protestors storming the
Michigan capitol building7 to a man ordering a sandwich in a North Carolina
restaurant with a rocket launcher strapped to his back.8
Sadly, these events have not all been bloodless gun-rights pageantry. A
man carrying an AK-47 rifle during a Black Lives Matter demonstration in
Austin, Texas, was shot and killed by a motorist who claimed that the victim
pointed the rifle at him as he drove through the crowd.9 In Kenosha,
Wisconsin, a seventeen-year-old self-designated city defender openly

5. Azi Paybarah & Aimee Ortiz, Felony Charges Filed Against St. Louis Couple Who Pointed
Guns at Protesters, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/us/markpatricia-mccloskey-charges.html [https://perma.cc/KCF7-B2U7]; see also Eric Ruben, The
Distortion of Self-Defense and the Second Amendment in Missouri, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L.:
SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (July 23, 2020), https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2020/07/the-distortion-ofself-defense-and-the-second-amendment-in-missouri/ [https://perma.cc/3TJV-TY65] (describing
the couple’s actions and purported feelings upon seeing the protestors).
6. Paybarah & Ortiz, supra note 5. The couple later spoke at the Republican National
Convention. Joan E. Greve, St Louis Couple Who Threatened Black Lives Matter Protesters Speak
at RNC, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2020, 12:31 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug
/24/st-louis-couple-rnc-mark-patricia-mccloskey [https://perma.cc/R7WX-XSZZ].
7. See Craig Mauger, Protesters, Some Armed, Enter Michigan Capitol in Rally
Against COVID-19 Limits, DET. NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020, 8:16 PM), https://www.detroitnews
.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/30/protesters-gathering-outside-capitol-amid-covid-19restrictions/3054911001/ [https://perma.cc/L9BR-58WH] (describing the actions of protestors and
noting that some were openly carrying firearms).
8. Thankfully, the rocket launcher was affixed with a sticker: “inert.” Justin Wise, Armed Stayat-Home Demonstrators Visit North Carolina Subway Shop, THE HILL (May 11, 2020, 8:38 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/497073-armed-demonstrators-protesting-stay-at-homeorder-visit-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/R4MA-R94P].
9. David Montgomery & Manny Fernandez, Garrett Foster Brought His Gun to Austin Protests.
Then He Was Shot Dead., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/us
/austin-shooting-texas-protests.html [https://perma.cc/86V6-NYL6].
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carrying an AR-15 rifle—and greeted warmly by the local police—killed two
protesters and wounded a third.10
There have been many more such incidents, reported and unreported.11
A reasonable observer might expect, at a minimum, that American criminal
law would have a clear regime to guide and control not only the acquisition
and firing of guns, but their display—a regime that accounts for both the
Second Amendment and widespread private possession of firearms.
Traditional criminal law does govern here. Indeed, many prominent
incidents (although not as many as one might expect) have resulted in arrests
for brandishing, assault with a firearm, menacing with a firearm, and other
related crimes.12 But the traditional machinery of criminal law falls woefully
short of effectively regulating gun displays in a society as saturated with
firearms as the United States. It delivers neither clear rules of conduct to
inform people what they are allowed to do, nor clear rules of decision to
instruct police and prosecutors what to permit and when to intervene.13
The purpose of this Essay is to describe gun displays as a distinct social
and legal phenomenon, to sketch the applicable legal rules, to explain why
and how those rules fall short, and to identify some of the costs of the present
legal regime. The lack of effective rules likely contributes to violence, terror,
racial inequities, and costly legal uncertainty—including for gun owners
themselves. We map the terrain and boundaries of this serious and growing
problem with reference to social practices, criminal law, and constitutional
law. We then conclude with some provisional thoughts about the possibilities
and limits of legal reform and the critical importance of social norms if the
country is to move toward a more stable and safer equilibrium.

10. Graham Kates, Homicide Charges Announced Against Kyle Rittenhouse, Accused of Killing
2 at Kenosha Protests, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2020, 7:22 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/kyle-rittenhouse-homicide-charges-kenosha-shooting-first-degree-homicide-jacob-blake-protestwisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/T6ZJ-2NXN]; Haley Willis, Muyi Xiao, Christiaan Triebert, Christoph
Koettl, Stella Cooper, David Botti, John Ismay & Ainara Tiefenthäler, Tracking the Suspect in the
Fatal Kenosha Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/
us/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shooting-video.html [https://perma.cc/EM8X-73SM].
11. See, e.g., Tom Batchelor, Louisville Police Officer Filmed Giving Advice to Heavily-Armed
‘Militia,’ NEWSWEEK (Sept. 24, 2020, 7:48 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/louisville-policeofficer-breonna-taylor-protests-militia-1534025 [https://perma.cc/AKF6-SLTP] (relaying an
incident of gun-rights pageantry carried out by a self-styled “militia” in Louisville, Kentucky).
12. See infra subparts II(A)–(B).
13. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 648–49 (1984) (exploring the dual function of substantive
criminal prohibitions in guiding both primary conduct and the conduct of legal actors).
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Gun Displays as a Distinct Social and Legal Phenomenon

The American gun debate tends to focus on bodies and bullets14—if and
how gun laws can help prevent some of the roughly 100,000 shootings every
year, or the 40,000 or so deaths from gunshots (mostly by suicide).15 This
focus is sensible, as even a one-percent change in casualties could mean
hundreds of lives saved. Of course, the answers are not empirically, legally,
or politically easy. Although most Americans think guns should be more
tightly regulated,16 others argue that the carnage would be even worse with
fewer guns.17 And the Second Amendment precludes some policy options.18
But the social and legal lives of guns are much more complicated than
the focus on bullets and bodies suggests. The vast majority of legally relevant
gun-related activity, whether salutary, benign, or unwelcome, does not
involve pulling a trigger. Most self-reported defensive gun uses, for example,
involve the simple display of a gun, not its actual discharge.19 Many guncarriers emphasize the peace of mind, confidence, and concentration they feel
carrying a gun,20 and the positive externalities—including safety—they
believe accrue to those around them.21
14. See Reva B. Siegel & Joseph Blocher, Why Regulate Guns?, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 11, 15 (2020) (asserting that the scope of the American gun control debate
is unduly limited to public safety concerns, ignoring other legitimate interests like the “freedom and
confidence to participate in every domain of our shared life”).
15. Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/ [https://perma.cc/KX5Z-GE4U]
(to show recorded incidents of firearm deaths and injuries, filter data to show “firearms” as the
“mechanism of death”).
16. Katherine Schaeffer, Share of Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Has Increased
Since 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/16
/share-of-americans-who-favor-stricter-gun-laws-has-increased-since-2017/
[https://perma.cc/
PM7K-D82F].
17. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUNCONTROL LAWS 19 (1998) (inferring from an observed inverse correlation between gun ownership
and crime that widespread gun ownership discourages criminal activity).
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[T]he enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”).
19. Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of SelfDefense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 173, 184 tbl.2 (1995) (reporting between
2.2 and 2.5 million defensive gun uses per year, with only about 200,000 involving physical harm).
20. See Terrence D. Hill, Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Andrew P. Davis & Amy M. Burdette,
Happiness Is a Warm Gun? Gun Ownership and Happiness in the United States (1973–2018), SSM
- POPULATION HEALTH, Apr. 2020, at 1, 2 (noting and explaining “several ways that guns could
promote happiness,” including freedom from fear and increased feelings of empowerment); Clayton
E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws,
62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 722 (1995) (“[I]f people feel safer because they carry a gun and in turn lead
happier lives because they feel safer and more secure, then the carrying of guns makes a direct and
nontrivial contribution to their overall quality of life.”).
21. See generally JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF
GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE (2015) (discussing common rationales for carrying firearms and
demonstrating that these rationales are a product of our societal setting).
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Some gun owners carry their guns in public to normalize conduct that
others—even other gun owners—regard as irresponsible or threatening.
When Texas “open carry” advocates took their rifles into fast-food
restaurants in 2014, the NRA issued a statement saying that such activity
“defies common sense . . . shows a lack of consideration and manners
. . . [and] not only is . . . rare, it’s downright weird.”22 The strong statement
led to a backlash by those eager to change the norms surrounding open carry
and the organization quickly retracted it.23 This kind of norm
entrepreneurialism by gun owners can, and is designed to, shift social
practices so as to shape the law and the cultural perception of gun use.
Not all agree that this change in norms is necessarily for the better.
Apprehension over what one former NRA president described as “the general
promiscuous toting of guns”24 appears to be broadly shared. Indeed, many
gun owners express discomfort with a norm of carrying firearms anyplace a
person happens to be.25 Undoubtedly, gun displays can and do impose
negative externalities. Some studies have found that most people report
feeling less safe when others around them have guns.26
That feeling alone is not enough to make others’ conduct unlawful,
however. In states where open carry is legal (nearly all of them), the mere act

22. Eric Lach, NRA Issues Amazing Statement Admitting Bringing AR-15s to Chipotle Is Dumb,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 2, 2014, 10:34 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/nraopen-carry-texas-weird-statement [https://perma.cc/QEH7-7HXQ].
23. Eric Lach, NRA Apologizes for Calling Guns-in-Restaurants Crowd ‘Weird,’ TALKING
POINTS MEMO (June 3, 2014, 6:35 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/nra-apologizesopen-carry-texas [https://perma.cc/N37C-LERW].
24. Michael S. Rosenwald, The Forgotten NRA Leader Who Thought Carrying Guns Should Be
‘Sharply Restricted,’ CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2017, 11:45 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nationworld/ct-forgotten-nra-leader-gun-control-20171007-story.html [https://perma.cc/TG26-JVH3];
see also Jacob Sullum, When the NRA Opposed Open Carry, REASON (June 17, 2014, 3:25 PM),
https://reason.com/2014/06/17/when-the-nra-opposed-open-carry/ [https://perma.cc/V9CJ-BF9R]
(citing the NRA’s support of California’s Mulford Act, which banned open carrying of loaded
firearms). Then-Governor Ronald Reagan, supporting a tightening of California’s gun laws after the
Black Panthers entered the state legislature openly carrying firearms, said: “There’s no reason why
on the street today a citizen should be carrying loaded weapons.” Cynthia Deitle Leonardatos,
California’s Attempts to Disarm the Black Panthers, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 972 (1999).
25. In a 2015 survey, gun owners were most supportive of carrying firearms into restaurants
(59%) but least supportive of carrying firearms in bars (26%). Only 16% supported carrying
firearms in a broad swath of public places such as schools, stadiums, churches, and government
buildings. See Julia A. Wolfson, Stephen P. Teret, Deborah Azrael & Matthew Miller, US Public
Opinion on Carrying Firearms in Public Places, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 929, 933 fig.2 (2017).
26. See, e.g., D. Hemenway, D. Azrael & M. Miller, National Attitudes Concerning Gun
Carrying in the United States, 7 INJ. PREVENTION 282, 283 (2001); cf. McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Your interest in keeping and bearing
a certain firearm may diminish my interest in being and feeling safe from armed violence.”).
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of toting a visible weapon is not a crime.27 But, as we explain below, small
changes in how a weapon is carried can transform activity from legally
protected to prohibited. Just as displaying weapons may be an
underappreciated form of defensive gun use, there is every reason to think
that displaying guns is also an underappreciated form of crime.
It is difficult to know how many Americans are illegally threatened with
guns each year, in part because victims of such threats do not show up in
hospital emergency rooms. It is not our purpose to make an original empirical
claim comparing criminal gun displays with the number of justified defensive
uses of guns. Defensive gun use is a matter of considerable dispute, with oftcited estimates varying by a factor of ten or more.28 There is already extensive
scholarly literature on whether expansive public carry laws lead to more or
less crime.29 Instead, our point is that the gun debate’s focus on violent crime,
particularly homicide, tends to leave other risks and costs of gun displays
unaccounted for in the empirical literature and unaddressed by the current
legal rules.
In short, gun displays are a distinct and important social and legal
phenomenon with very high stakes. Consider that some self-reported surveys
indicate that, of the 2.2 to 2.5 million defensive gun uses annually, only about
200,000 involved physical wounding of the assailant.30 (Both of these
numbers appear to be overestimates, considering that only 100,000 shooting
victims are treated in hospitals every year; for our purposes the ratio is what
matters.)31 But that does not mean that nothing legally relevant happens when
no one is shot. Inevitably, some (likely significant) portion of these incidents
involve false positives: mistaken apprehension of a threat, for example,
leading the gun owner to brandish his weapon and the other person to flee.
The gun owner leaves the scene thinking that he has successfully defended
27. It might, however, be enough to support a stop and frisk. See United States v. Robinson,
846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). But see United States v. Watson, 900 F.3d 892, 895–
96 (7th Cir. 2018) (Barrett, J.) (holding that merely displaying weapons where lawful does not give
rise to reasonable suspicion).
28. See generally The Challenges of Defining and Measuring Defensive Gun Use, RAND CORP.
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/defensive-gun-use.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8SJ-QH49] (describing the measurement difficulties in estimating the incidence
of defensive gun uses and the resulting large variation in estimates).
29. Compare LOTT, supra note 17, at 19–20 (concluding that citizen carry laws aid in reducing
crime), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (2003) (describing shortcomings in the statistical
models used by Lott and asserting that “if anything, there is stronger evidence for the conclusion
that [shall-issue] laws increase crime than there is for the conclusion that they decrease it”).
30. Kleck & Gertz, supra note 19.
31. See David Hemenway, Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of
Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1442–44 (1997) (comparing Kleck
and Gertz’s estimates of assailants wounded by gun-carrying victims to the number of non-fatal
firearm-related injuries treated in emergency rooms each year and analyzing issues in their
estimates).
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himself, but (depending on some of the factors we discuss in Part II) the other
person may have been the victim of a crime. In one study, researchers
summarized self-reported defensive gun uses from a survey and then sent the
summaries to criminal court judges. Even taking the facts as true, and
assuming the gun owner was legally armed and carrying, the judges
concluded roughly half of the incidents to be potentially illegal.32
These costs do not fall on everyone equally. Recent headlines and
cellphone recordings illustrate what research has long shown: Gun displays
are likely to have racialized distributional effects, because threat perception
is strongly correlated with various kinds of implicit racial bias.33 This
suggests African Americans are disproportionately likely to be victimized by
crimes like brandishing and gun-related assault—incidents that gun owners
may wrongly perceive as self-defense—because African Americans are more
likely to be seen as threatening. Studies have found that identical behavior—
an ambiguous shove, say—is many times more likely to be characterized as
“violent behavior” when the person doing the shoving is black and the
“victim” is white.34 Even absent physical contact, studies have found that
young black men are perceived as bigger (taller, heavier, more muscular) and
more physically threatening (stronger, more capable of harm) than young
white men,35 and that higher implicit prejudice is associated with a greater
32. D. Hemenway, D. Azrael & M. Miller, Gun Use in the United States: Results from Two
National Surveys, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 263, 264–65 (2000); see also Otis Dudley Duncan, As
Compared to What? Offensive and Defensive Gun Use Surveys, 1973–94, at 10–11 (Nat’l Inst. of
Just., Working Paper No. 185056, 2000) (describing interpretive problems with surveys in which
respondents are asked about their defensive use of guns and noting that the respondents may have
been mistaken about the threat and whether they themselves committed an assault); Otis Dudley
Duncan, Gun Use Surveys: In Numbers We Trust?, CRIMINOLOGIST, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 1, 1, 3
(providing examples of the misuse of survey data involving the defensive use of guns due to, among
other things, confusion about whether the defensive gun use by survey respondents was actually
lawful).
33. See, e.g., Michael C. Gearhart, Kristen A. Berg, Courtney Jones & Sharon D. Johnson, Fear
of Crime, Racial Bias, and Gun Ownership, 44 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 241, 242, 245–46 (2019)
(reporting research findings indicating that gun owners are more vigilant in responding to perceived
threats and more likely to direct their vigilance at racial and ethnic minorities).
34. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 590, 595–
97 (1976) (75% of participants characterized the shove as violent when the protagonist was black
and the victim white, compared to only 17% when the races in the scenario were switched); see also
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudices: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice
Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 753 (1995) (describing a study of schoolchildren that found both
black and white children perceive ambiguously aggressive behaviors of black individuals as more
threatening than the same behaviors of white individuals).
35. See, e.g., H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black
and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 590, 590, 596 (1980) (“Cultural differences between subject groups were apparent in the
greater tendency of the white children to read threat into ambiguously aggressive behaviors
involving no physical contact and to assume that the perpetrators of such behaviors were stronger
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readiness to perceive anger in black faces.36 The “presumption of
dangerousness” that corresponds with darker skin tones and stronger
Afrocentric facial features37 may not only lead to more gun displays against
black people but also influence how jurors and other decisionmakers evaluate
the lawfulness of the display.38
One particular scenario that might cause a gun owner (or for that matter,
a police officer39) to pull his weapon in self-defense is the impression that the
person he is confronting is also armed. Although they are not equally
distributed, there are more than 300 million guns in private hands in the
United States.40 The more guns in a society, the more likely individuals will
assume others are armed.41 In any given encounter, however, that impression
might be mistaken. And the mistakes also are not equally distributed;
evidence shows that one form of threat-perception failure—mistaking
innocuous objects for weapons—is especially likely when the other person is
black.42 One study found that participants primed with a white face were
more likely to mistake a gun for a tool, while those primed with a black face

than the recipients.”); John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas O. Rule, Racial Bias in
Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 59, 60 (2017) (pointing to seven different studies reaching this conclusion).
36. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 640, 641–42 (2003).
37. Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal and the Presumption of
Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 745, 785 (2018) (“Repeated studies indicate Blacks with darker skin tones and stronger
Afrocentric facial features ‘activate automatic associations with negative behavioral stereotypes of
Black men, such as aggression, violence, and criminality.’” (internal citation omitted)).
38. Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing BodyCamera Video Evidence, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 172 (2018).
39. Lois James, The Stability of Implicit Racial Bias in Police Officers, 21 POLICE Q. 30, 40–
41 (2018) (“[O]fficers tended to have moderate (35%) to strong (37%) bias associating Black
Americans with weapons. Approximately 12% of officers had slight anti-Black bias and a further
12% had no bias. Finally, a combined 3% of the sample had anti-White bias (associating White
Americans with weapons).”).
40. Scott Horsley, Guns in America, by the Numbers, NPR (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2016/01/05/462017461/guns-in-america-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/ZQU8RNTN].
41. Cf. Jill Lepore, The Long Blue Line, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2020, at 64, 65 (noting that
“[t]he difference [between the U.S. and other countries] is guns”—in Finland, the police fired six
bullets in all of 2013, whereas in Pasco, Washington, three police officers fired seventeen in one
day in 2015).
42. See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial
Arts Training, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2016, at 145, 157–58 (summarizing a 2012 shooter
bias study in which both civilians and police offers were quicker to identify black individuals as
carrying a firearm than individuals of any other race).
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were more likely to mistake a tool for a gun.43 Others have confirmed a direct
(and bi-directional) link between blackness and guns.44
Because threat perception is thoroughly racialized, African Americans
are more likely to be victimized by gun crimes like brandishing and assault
when the gun-bearer wrongly believes himself to be engaged in self-defense.
And that, in turn, means African Americans will suffer disproportionately
when the machinery of criminal law is insufficient to address these
encounters.
Another set of concerns are not specifically about race, but about guns
more generally. Some studies have concluded that the mere presence of a
firearm can prime people to behave more aggressively—a phenomenon
known as the “weapons effect.”45 People in possession of a gun are more
likely to classify other objects as guns and to engage in threat-induced
43. D. Lisa Cothran, Facial Affect and Race Influence Threat Perception, 30 IMAGINATION
COGNITION & PERSONALITY 341, 348 (2011); see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception:
The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 181, 190 (2001) (“Results of this research strongly support the hypothesis that the
race of faces paired with objects does influence the perceptual identification of weapons. . . .
Harmless distracters were more likely to be classified as guns when primed by a Black face than
when primed by a White face.”).
44. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black:
Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 878 (2004). Professor
Eberhardt and her coauthors describe a study yielding such results as follows:
In Study 1, we demonstrate that merely exposing people to Black male faces lowers
the perceptual threshold at which they detect degraded images of crime-relevant
objects (e.g., guns and knives). In Study 2, we show that exposing people to crimerelevant objects prompts them to visually attend to Black male faces, suggesting that
the association of Blacks and criminality is bidirectional.
Id. See generally Charles M. Judd, Irene V. Blair & Kristine M. Chapleau, Automatic Stereotypes
vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J.
EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 75, 75 (2004) (“In an extension of Payne’s procedure, we show that AfricanAmerican faces facilitate the categorization of both handguns and sports-related objects, but not the
categorization of insects or fruits.” (analyzing Payne, supra note 43)).
45. See, e.g., Arlin James Benjamin, Jr. & Brad J. Bushman, The Weapons Priming Effect,
CURRENT OP. PSYCHOLOGY, Dec. 2016, at 45, 45 (describing multiple studies analyzing the
“weapons effect” and its possible cognitive underpinnings); Craig A. Anderson, Arlin J. Benjamin,
Jr. & Bruce D. Bartholow, Does the Gun Pull the Trigger? Automatic Priming Effects of Weapon
Pictures and Weapon Names, 9 PSYCH. SCI. 308, 312 (1998) (proposing based on two experiments
that the simple identification of weapons increases the accessibility of aggressive thoughts); see also
Arlin J. Benjamin, Jr., Sven Kepes & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts,
Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the
Weapons Effect Literature, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 347, 359 (2018) (summarizing a
study which showed “merely seeing a weapon can increase aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals,
and aggressive behavior”); Brad J. Bushman, The “Weapons Effect,” PSYCH. TODAY
(Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/get-/psyched/201301/the-weaponseffect [https://perma.cc/DJB2-W9F8] (“Several studies have replicated the weapons effect.”). But
see GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 29 (1991) (doubting the
weapons effect studies, arguing that the “protection gun owners feel safer because they have a gun
in their home . . . . [T]he net effect of home gun possession on gun owners is to reduce fear of
crime”).

BLOCHER.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1182

5/15/2021 12:18 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1173

behavior, like raising their own gun to fire.46 Further, the presence of a gun
has been linked to aggressive responses47—in particular, from men who have
already been subject to aggression-eliciting stimuli.48
These empirical findings suggest that the social practice of gun displays
is unlikely to settle into a desirable equilibrium in which beneficial displays
of guns outweigh the costs, or that any such social practice will avoid
undesirable and inequitable distributional effects. In these circumstances, and
faced with such harms, it makes sense to ask whether the criminal law is
regulating, or can effectively regulate, this kind of behavior.
II.

Criminal Law’s Deficiency in Regulating Gun Displays
One might reasonably hope for the law to draw a clear line between
defensive and criminal gun displays. And yet, as we explain below, that line
is both thin and blurry. It is thin because small factual differences separate
acts of self-defense from crime—the angle of the gun barrel, the precise
location of the incident, the appearance of the perceived attacker, and so on.
It is blurry because the legal standards that define the line themselves turn on
hazy concepts like reasonableness, proportionality, and intent that are nearly
impossible to clearly articulate ex ante.
In contrast with, for example, possession-based gun crimes (like those
prohibiting felons from having firearms), this lack of clarity is a significant
deterrent for prosecutors and police and demands much of judges and juries.
The haziness also makes it hard for people to know their legal rights:
Criminal law does not provide clear guidance to either the citizen who
wonders when she can display her weapon or the citizen who wonders if she
has been victimized by such a display.
A.

Offenses

Is it a crime to point a gun at a person? As with all American criminal
law, the specifics vary by state. But, in general, yes.

46. Jessica K. Witt & James R. Brockmole, Action Alters Object Identification: Wielding a Gun
Increases the Bias to See Guns, 38 J. EXP. PSYCH 1159, 1165 (2012).
47. See generally David Hemenway, Mary Vriniotis & Matthew Miller, Is an Armed Society a
Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 687 (2006). This
study’s abstract characterizes its methods and results as follows:
Data come from a 2004 national random digit dial survey of over 2400 licensed drivers.
Respondents were asked whether, in the past year, they (1) made obscene or rude
gestures at another motorist, (2) aggressively followed another vehicle too closely, and
(3) were victims of such hostile behaviors. . . . Similar to a survey of Arizona
motorists, in our survey, riding with a firearm in the vehicle was a marker for
aggressive and dangerous driver behavior.
Id. at 687.
48. Leonard Berkowitz & Anthony LePage, Weapons as Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 202, 203 (1967).
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Consider the jurisdictions governing some of the incidents described in
the introduction. In Florida (the masking argument in the Walmart),
misdemeanor assault is “an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do
violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person
that such violence is imminent.”49 This crime is a felony if committed “[w]ith
a deadly weapon without intent to kill.” 50 In addition, it is a misdemeanor in
Florida for any person carrying a firearm to, “in the presence of one or more
persons, exhibit the same in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner,
not in necessary self-defense.”51 Thus, Florida makes it a crime to point an
actually or apparently loaded firearm at another person during most hostile
encounters. Police initially filed charges in the Walmart incident on this
theory.
In Michigan (the confrontation in the Chipotle parking lot), assault with
a firearm is a felony.52 Michigan does not define assault by statute but rather
has incorporated the state’s common law of assault into its statutes.53 The
relevant decisions unfortunately are not a model of clarity. But it is plain that
Michigan law treats as assault some kinds of threatening behavior that
involve no physical contact.54
Michigan courts have defined simple assault as “an attempt to commit
a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension
of receiving an immediate battery”; as “any attempt or offer with force or
violence to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness,
with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention to do it, coupled
with a present ability to carry such intention into effect”; and as “any
unlawful physical force partly or fully put in motion creating a reasonable
apprehension of immediate injury to a human being.”55
Plainly, pointing a firearm at another person and at a range that could
inflict injury would satisfy these definitions of assault—as long as something
about the circumstances, including but not limited to the words or behavior
of the person doing the pointing, would cause a reasonable person to fear that

49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011 (West 2020).
50. Id. § 784.021; see also Cambell v. State, 37 So. 3d 948, 950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(“Nowhere does either statute require as an element of the crime that the accused had to intend to
do physical harm to the victim.”).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.10.
52. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.82(1) (West 2019).
53. See People v. Gardner, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1978) (adopting the common law majority
rule for the definition of assault).
54. People v. Carlson, 125 N.W. 361, 362 (Mich. 1910).
55. People v. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d 433, 435–36 (Mich. 1998); Gardner, 265 N.W.2d. at 7;
Carlson, 125 N.W. at 362.
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the gun might imminently be fired. Presumably that is the prosecutor’s theory
behind the charges brought for the incident in the Chipotle parking lot.56
Michigan’s code also criminalizes, as misdemeanors, “recklessly or
heedlessly or willfully [handling] any firearm without due caution and
circumspection for the rights, safety or property of others”57 and
“intentionally but without malice point[ing] or aim[ing] a firearm at or
toward another person.”58
In Missouri (the St. Louis couple with guns in front of their home),
misdemeanor assault consists of “purposely plac[ing] another person in
apprehension of immediate physical injury.”59 Felony assault requires
causing actual physical injury.60 However, it is a separate felony in Missouri
to “knowingly . . . [e]xhibit[], in the presence of one or more persons, any
weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.”61
This firearm offense includes an explicit (and probably unnecessary)
exception that cross-references Missouri’s self-defense statute.62 Thus, the
pointing of an actually or apparently loaded firearm at another person is, in
most hostile circumstances, at least facially both a misdemeanor and a felony
under Missouri law.
In addition, Missouri’s “licensed concealed carry” statute states that a
licensee “may briefly and openly display the firearm to the ordinary sight of
another person, unless the firearm is intentionally displayed in an angry or
threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense.”63 Florida’s criminal
firearm statutes contain an identical provision.64 Thus, Missouri’s and
Florida’s criminal codes could be read as implying that some forms of display
are lawful, even if direct pointing may not be.
In Texas (where the Austin confrontation involving mutual display
escalated to a shooting), the bar is set higher for an assault charge, requiring
either the causing of physical injury or at least an intentional or knowing
“threat” of “imminent” injury.65 It seems unlikely that a display amounting
to an intended warning could satisfy this definition. However, Texas
56. See supra note 4.
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.863a (West 2019).
58. Id. § 750.233(1). At least one Michigan prosecutor expressed concern that the addition of
an intent requirement makes the brandishing prohibition duplicative of the general prohibition on
assault. Alex Mitchell, Legal Uncertainties About Openly Carrying Guns in Michigan Present
Challenges for Law Enforcement, MLIVE (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/
kalamazoo/2014/05/open_carry.html [https://perma.cc/4FAC-4LST].
59. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.056 (West 2019).
60. Id. § 565.054.
61. Id. § 571.030.
62. Id. § 571.030(5).
63. Id. § 571.037.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.053(1) (West 2020).
65. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1–2) (West 2020).
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separately criminalizes “deadly conduct,” defined, at the misdemeanor level,
as recklessly placing another in “imminent” danger of serious injury. The
deadly conduct statute creates a presumption of both recklessness and danger
“if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another.”66
Texas law further defines as misdemeanor disorderly conduct “display[ing]
a firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to
alarm.”67 The Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified that not every alarming
gun display qualifies; to violate the statute, “a person must intentionally and
knowingly display a firearm in a public place in a manner that he knows is
likely, under an objective standard of reasonableness, to frighten the average,
ordinary person.”68 Thus, pointing a gun at another person in Texas is likely
a misdemeanor crime in many circumstances, but Texas law also leaves room
in at least some situations for rebutting a prosecutor’s arguments that the
actor had a reckless state of mind and placed the other person in imminent
danger.
B.

Defenses

Of course, virtually any situation in which a gun owner points a firearm
at another person in a hostile encounter in a public place will generate a selfdefense claim by the gun owner. Not only is that the most obvious basis on
which to defend against any allegation of assault or related firearm offense,
but the concept of self-defense is at the very core of contemporary American
gun (especially handgun) culture.69
Again, consider the applicable rules in the jurisdictions previously
discussed, which are fairly typical of the progression of self-defense law in
states that have attempted to accommodate, in whole or in part, the agendas
of gun-rights advocates. It should first be noted that self-defense, which
eventually merged into the ancient common law defense of justification, is a
general defense in most or all American jurisdictions. That is, while the
elements of the defense can be demanding, one can at least assert a self-

66. Id. § 22.05; Amaro v. State, 287 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. ref’d)
(“[M]erely pointing a firearm in another’s direction can place that person in imminent danger of
serious bodily injury.”).
67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(8) (West 2020).
68. State v. Ross, 573 S.W.3d 817, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
69. David Yamane, Paul Yamane & Sebastian L. Ivory, Targeted Advertising: Documenting
the Emergence of Gun Culture 2.0 in Guns Magazine, 1955–2019, PALGRAVE COMMC’NS, Apr. 15,
2020, at 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0437-0 [https://perma.cc/QQK4-S5TQ]
(describing the shift in gun culture towards “Gun Culture 2.0,” which “centers on home and personal
protection through armed citizenship, notably the legal carrying of concealed weapons, mostly
handguns, in public by ordinary Americans”); Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the
Primary Motivation for American Gun Ownership, a Landmark Survey Finds, TRACE (Sept. 19,
2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-self-defense/ [https://
perma.cc/Z42T-GNA7].
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defense claim against any charge whatsoever as long as force was plausibly
necessary for self-protection.70
Florida’s self-defense regime, which gained national attention following
George Zimmerman’s killing of Trayvon Martin, begins with the
longstanding principle inherited from the common law—that “[a] person is
justified in using or threatening to use force . . . against another when and to
the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary
to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of
unlawful force.”71
Florida’s principal statutory innovation in the law of self-defense, like
that of many other “stand your ground” states, is to modify the longstanding
rules of retreat in self-defense law, which were designed to ensure that only
strictly necessary uses of force would be legally justified. Whereas the
common law and many older statutes deprived an actor of a self-defense
claim if she could have avoided the threat to her safety by moving to another
location (especially if she was not already in her home), the Florida regime
states that the actor asserting self-defense has no duty to retreat and “has the
right to stand his or her ground” and meet force with force if the actor is
attacked in “a place where he or she has a right to be” (as, for example, in a
store or public parking lot).72 Florida law further contains provisions that
(1) create a presumption of the actor’s reasonable belief in imminent harm if
a person is unlawfully entering the actor’s dwelling or vehicle,73 and
(2) confusingly provide “immunity” from prosecution to persons whom the
police conclude after investigation acted in self-defense.74
Texas, like Florida, is a “stand your ground” state. Its criminal code
provides that: (1) common law retreat principles do not apply if the actor has
“a right to be present at the location where the force is used”;75 (2) the
factfinder may not consider whether the actor did not retreat in determining

70. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a classic
and thorough explication of the common law of self-defense).
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(1) (West 2020).
72. Id. § 776.012(2).
73. Id. § 776.013(2)(a).
74. Id. § 776.032(1–2). The oddity of Florida’s immunity provision is that in American criminal
procedure, a claim of immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss before trial or sometimes, if the
legal question of immunity turns on a factual dispute, before a jury at trial. Florida’s law appears to
direct the police to make an extraordinary legal determination of immunity, in addition to the
ordinary determination of probable cause, before deciding whether to arrest in the first instance. See
Eliott C. McLaughlin, Prosecutor Overrules Sheriff, Charges Florida Man in ‘Stand Your Ground’
Case, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/13/us/stand-your-groundflorida-shooting-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/3YYW-77UA] (quoting the Pinellas County
sheriff, who stated: “To arrest, it must be so clear that, as a matter of law, ‘stand your ground’ does
not apply in any way to the facts and circumstances that you’re presented with”).
75. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(e) (West 2020).
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whether the actor’s belief in the necessity of force was reasonable;76 and
(3) when the use of force would otherwise be justifiable under the state’s selfdefense law, the threat to use force is also lawful.77
In Michigan, a slightly different statutory scheme also establishes a
version of the right to “stand your ground.” Michigan’s self-defense statute
provides:
An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a
crime at the time he or she uses force other than deadly force may use
force other than deadly force against another individual anywhere he
or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if he or she
honestly and reasonably believes that the use of that force is necessary
to defend himself or herself or another individual from the imminent
unlawful use of force by another individual.78
Again, the “right to be” principle provides that there is no duty to retreat
from a hostile encounter with another citizen in a public place, even if a safe
retreat is possible.79 Judicial decisions explain that the obligation to retreat
persists in Michigan only for persons who are initial aggressors in a
confrontation, who are participants in agreed “mutual combat,” or who
reinitiate hostilities after parties to a confrontation have retreated to safety.80
Missouri law also begins from the basic common law principle of
necessity, authorizing the defensive use of force when an actor “reasonably
believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third
person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use

76. Id. § 9.31(f).
77. Id. § 9.04.
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.972(2) (West 2019).
79. The concept is freighted with some gendered normative significance, even in its alternative
title of the “true man” defense. See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876) (“[A] true man,
who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously
seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.”); see also Mary Anne Franks, Real Men
Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as
Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2014) (arguing that Stand Your Ground laws,
while purporting to benefit women, “actually reinforce and exacerbate existing gender divides in
self-defense law that disproportionately harm women”); Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes
from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 240 (2008) (“[T]he modern Castle
Doctrine leverages the subordinated woman into a general model of self-defense rooted in the
imperative to protect the home and family from attack.”).
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.973–.974 (West 2019); see also People v. Riddle, 649
N.W.2d 30, 42, 42 n.25 (Mich. 2002) (explaining that Michigan law imposes an affirmative duty to
retreat only “when the defendant was the voluntary participant in mutual combat” and that one who
is the initial aggressor is generally not entitled to claim self-defense at all); People v. Montgomery,
No. 309993, 2013 WL 2662378, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 2013) (per curiam) (finding that the
evidence did not support an instruction for self-defense when the defendant “chose to return and
confront [the complainant] with a gun” after the initial aggressor had abandoned the fight and both
parties had retreated to safety).
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of unlawful force by such other person.”81 Missouri is also a “stand your
ground” state, providing that a person has no duty to retreat while “in any . . .
location such person has the right to be.”82 (To see the contrasting approach,
consider the Model Penal Code, drafted in the 1960s, which imposes an
obligation to retreat, even in the face of an unlawful demand to refrain from
legally protected conduct, so long as the actor does not have a “duty” to be
in the place in question.)83
In Florida, Texas, Michigan, and Missouri, as in many other states, the
burden of proof further favors claims of self-defense. The defendant need
only meet a burden of production by introducing some evidence to inject the
question of self-defense into the litigation, after which the prosecutor must
disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.84 Burdens of
proof can be decisive in resolving the lawfulness of many violent encounters,
as was likely the case in the prosecution and acquittal of George Zimmerman,
if there are no eyewitnesses or video or audio records of the encounter.
C.

Shortcomings
While criminal law in many American jurisdictions is reasonably clear
that pointing a firearm at a person during a confrontation in public can be a
crime (at least at the misdemeanor level), it is extremely opaque—indeed,
even intentionally noncommittal—about when such conduct will be a crime.
This is so for two reasons, the second of which presents the greater problem.
First, assault definitions often turn on difficult factual questions about the
actor’s intent and the victim’s perceptions. Key to this difficulty is that,
during a confrontation, both defensive pointing of a firearm and threatening
pointing of a firearm generate reasonable fear in those at whom the gun is
pointed. The difference in legality between the two scenarios may then turn
on the beliefs and intentions of the person pointing the weapon.
That leads to the second, more troublesome problem. Because all such
encounters will, if treated as criminal cases, involve claims of self-defense,
liability will almost always pivot on the actor’s “reasonable belief” in the
necessity of displaying or pointing the gun. Some states, like Florida, make
this a subjective inquiry for all practical purposes.85 Coupled with the
81. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (West 2019).
82. Id. § 563.031(3).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
84. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031(5) (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03(c–d) (West
2020); Mosansky v. State, 33 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); People v.
Dupree, 788 N.W.2d 399, 408–09 (Mich. 2010).
85. See Elizabeth Esther Berenguer, The Color of Fear: A Cognitive-Rhetorical Analysis of How
Florida’s Subjective Fear Standard in Stand Your Ground Cases Ratifies Racism, 76 MD. L. REV.
726, 741 (2017) (“Although the reasonable person standard is the majority rule for most Stand Your
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increasingly common rule that no person rightfully in a location is obliged to
retreat to retain the defense, this means that the legality of pointing guns in
public places is almost entirely a situational matter. To be sure, American
self-defense law retains its commitment to the principle of proportional use
of force as a subsidiary principle to necessity. Firing, and perhaps even
pointing, a gun to ward off being jostled in a crowd, for example, should not
give rise to any valid claim of self-defense. But proportionality itself turns on
blurry notions of reasonable belief: pointing or even firing a gun might be
reasonable if one person believes another to be armed or (as Zimmerman
apparently argued with success) believes it necessary to fend off a manual
attack that might end in a deadly blow.
Adding to the opacity of current law, stand-your-ground statutes elide
questions of time and place when they impose no duty to retreat if the actor
has “a right to be” in the place. How far can one go in placing oneself in a
location and for a duration of time, fully armed, with the expectation or hope
that a “necessity” to use deadly force might develop (as, for example, in the
events preceding the deadly violence in Kenosha86)? To be sure, even newer
statutes purport to deny “stand your ground” rights, as the older “castle
doctrine” does, to individuals who provoke the threat necessitating selfdefense or who are found to be the “initial aggressor.” But whether a person
who has “a right to be” in a place could also be found to be a provoker or
aggressor because they hoped to find a confrontation that might justify selfdefense remains an entirely open question.87
American criminal law provides exceedingly little ex ante guidance on
how lawfully possessed firearms can and should be carried, displayed,
brandished, pointed, and referred to in verbal statements. In broad terms, the
conduct rule for firearm pointing amounts to something like: “[I]t will be
lawful if a prosecutor cannot prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
you did not reasonably believe that you were in danger of being harmed.” In
a country pervaded with guns, intense political hostilities, racial fears and
divisiveness—and, at the moment, a frightening pandemic involving a deadly
virus—what does it even mean to be “reasonable” in how one forms one’s
fears, as an argument escalates on the sidewalk in front of a house or in a
store parking lot?
The increasing phenomenon of dozens and sometimes hundreds of
armed individuals converging in one place exposes just how inadequate the
Ground laws, Florida’s codified Stand Your Ground laws call for a subjective analysis.”); id. at 727
(arguing that “subjective standards not only absolve negative race-based behaviors but actually
ratify, condone, and perpetuate implicit biases and racist beliefs”).
86. See supra note 10.
87. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Stand Your Ground, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF APPLIED ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW 731 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds.,
2019) (examining possible moral justifications for “Stand Your Ground” laws).
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criminal law is in policing the boundary between protected gun use and
prohibited gun crime. Whether these armed individuals assemble to protest,
to protect, or just because they can, the presence of so many private firearms
generates volatility that existing criminal law is incapable of reducing ex
ante.
All of these armed individuals can claim that they are in a place they
have a right to be. Any of these individuals can claim that he brought a
weapon in anticipation that counter-protestors or others would be similarly
armed. And any one of them, if he points a weapon at another, can argue he
is responding proportionately to the actual or apparent threat of other armed
individuals. That these conflicts tend to be adjudicated only after someone
pulls a trigger highlights the deficiencies of the existing criminal legal
regime.
In sum, the criminal law’s lines around gun displays are both thin and
blurry. The prospects that this regime could even punish people in a
principled manner, much less establish viable rules for the handling of
firearms at a protest, on the road, in a parking lot, and at a store, are extremely
dim. This worrying picture emerges simply from the face of the applicable
laws and a few recent examples. The problem looks even worse in light of
the chronically capricious and racialized exercise of discretion in police
departments and prosecutors’ offices in fifty states and hundreds of cities and
counties.
Just as we noted that threat perceptions are themselves racialized and
prone to bias, so too are law enforcement’s attempts to crack down on crime,
particularly gun crime. The enforcement disparities are stark with easily
proven gun possession charges, where African Americans are far more likely
to be charged with unlawful possession than white Americans.88 Given the
added difficulty of charges for gun-pointing offenses, it stands to reason that
systematic biases will systematically favor white Americans over African
Americans. Recent events involving white, armed, self-proclaimed militias
allowed to operate freely in public support this hypothesis.89

88. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2194–97 (2016)
(recounting statistics of racial disparities in weapons-offense arrests but adding the caveat that we
do not have good data on the underlying number of offenses that are not charged).
89. For example, none of the gun carriers who stormed the Michigan legislature in April 2020
were arrested, despite broad acknowledgement that some of their actions were threatening and
intimidating. See Sarah Rahal & Craig Mauger, Armed Protesters in Michigan Capitol
Have Lawmakers Questioning Policy, DET. NEWS (May 3, 2020, 12:24 AM), https://www
.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/05/02/armed-protesters-michigan-capitol-havelawmakers-questioning-policy/3071928001/ [https://perma.cc/Z6B2-KXW3] (quoting Michigan
State Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey as condemning armed protestors who “used intimidation
and the threat of physical harm to stir up fear and feed rancor”); see also Michael German, Hidden
in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement, BRENNAN
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III. The Shadow of the Second Amendment
The previous Part canvassed the relevant rules of criminal law and
showed how they are inadequate to fully manage public interactions that
seem increasingly to involve gun displays. But any discussion of guns in the
United States must also ask to what extent the right to keep and bear arms
shapes behavior and influences the contours of criminal law. In the context
of gun displays, this could happen in two ways: (1) doctrinal rules that restrict
the state’s ability to punish conduct, and (2) constitutional rhetoric that
shapes ancillary doctrines and public understanding. There is no freestanding
constitutional right to threaten another person with a gun. However, criminal
law’s indeterminacy is compounded by constitutional law, which is rapidly
making the norms and laws surrounding arms display and bearing unstable
and hotly contested.
A.

The Second Amendment’s Limited Doctrinal Role
In District of Columbia v. Heller,90 the Supreme Court struck down a
D.C. law banning handgun possession in the home. The law had been passed
at a time of skyrocketing firearm violence that was chiefly affecting
the District’s large black community.91 In response to endemic
underenforcement of violent crimes involving black victims, the D.C. law
was designed to show, in James Forman’s words, that “at least in D.C., the
killing of black men mattered.”92 But the mores and discourse around
firearms changed considerably between the city council’s decision in 1975
and the Supreme Court’s decision in 2008.93
Writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia concluded that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected
to service in a militia. And the “central component” of that right is the interest

CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hiddenplain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law [https://perma.cc/V5FB-KRBZ]
(citing FBI counterterrorism policy documents and other sources documenting “active links”
between militia and white supremacist groups and law enforcement officers).
90. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
91. JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 57 (2017) (observing that in 1975, “85 percent of those killed by guns in the District of
Columbia were black, and so were a similar percentage of murder suspects”); see also Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2018)
(“African Americans bore the brunt of a crime wave sweeping D.C. and much of the nation.
Handguns made the crisis lethal, threatening black communities—especially the poor among
them—in ways that made the turn to criminal law irresistible.” (internal citations omitted)).
92. FORMAN, supra note 91, at 74.
93. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (arguing that “Heller’s originalism enforces
understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through
popular constitutionalism”).
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in self-defense.94 D.C.’s law violated the Constitution because it banned the
firearm most frequently chosen for self-defense and extended into the home,
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”95 So
did D.C.’s separate requirement that other firearms be kept locked or
disassembled at all times; notably, the Court refused to accept the District’s
argument that the statute retained a self-defense exception that would allow
a person to unlock her weapon when faced with a threat.96
But the majority opinion in Heller also emphasized that the right to keep
and bear arms has limits, and that a potentially wide range of “longstanding”
gun regulations are constitutionally permissible.97 The Court invoked
Blackstone, for example, as support for the government’s power to ban
“dangerous and unusual” weapons.98 And so it is worth noting that in the
cited passage, Blackstone concluded that “riding or going armed, with
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.”99 That theme of protecting “the good
people” from terror became a focus of early American gun laws as well, as
manifest in the brandishing laws adopted—and still on the books—
throughout the United States.100
Heller, then, seemed to tie the Second Amendment to notions of selfdefense, albeit in an odd way. The Court did not purport to change or augment
the traditional doctrine of self-defense, but to vindicate that doctrine by
limiting regulations on a technology used in its performance. But, as Eric
Ruben has shown, the common law doctrine of self-defense is cabined in
ways that gun-rights advocates and activists, not to mention Heller itself,
seldom acknowledge.101 The doctrine traditionally requires the force used to
be necessary and proportional and, as a procedural matter, the defense is
adjudicated during a criminal trial, not through ex ante immunities from
arrest or prosecution.102 There’s a noticeable tension between Heller’s focus

94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
95. Id. at 628–29.
96. Id. at 630.
97. Id. at 626–27.
98. Id. at 627 (“We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”).
99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 149 (emphasis omitted).
100. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment
Rights, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 55, 63 (describing early American brandishing
laws); see also Joseph Blocher & Reva B. Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New
Account of Public Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 27–28), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764258 (discussing
the longstanding and broadly enacted laws against brandishing weapons).
101. Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 67 (2020).
102. Id.
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on ready handgun access and the ultimate goal of self-defense law to
“shepherd conflicts away from lethal violence.”103
A federal district court in Illinois recently confronted Heller’s
ambiguous relationship with the traditional rules of armed self-defense.104
There, a Chicago police dispatcher sued the City after she was fired for
shooting another motorist during an off-duty altercation. She claimed that the
City’s action violated the Second Amendment because she was engaged in
lawful self-defense. Rejecting that connection, the court held that “historical
legal commentary and custom indicate that the question of whether a
particular actual use of a gun constitutes self-defense is a question left to
criminal and tort law, about which the Second Amendment is silent.” It
therefore dismissed the claim that the firing constituted retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutional right.105
Although Heller addressed a home handgun ban, the Supreme Court
declared that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”106 As a result, the
Constitution may impose limits on a state’s authority to criminalize carrying
firearms in public. In Moore v. Madigan,107 the Seventh Circuit held just
that.108 Heller unmistakably implied, said Judge Richard Posner, that “the
constitutional right of armed self-defense” extends beyond keeping a gun in
one’s house.109 And perhaps the Constitution has something to say about how
firearms can be carried in public.110
Heller, then, clearly does take “certain policy choices off the table.”111
Given current doctrine, a state likely cannot attack the destabilizing presence
of guns in public by keeping them all homebound, though a wide range of
time, place, and manner-type restrictions are still available, as are some

103. Id. at 68.
104. Calderone v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17,
2019), aff’d No. 19-2858, 2020 WL 6500933 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2020).
105. Id. at *1–4; see also id. at *4 (“The Court is unaware of any authority indicating that the
Second Amendment is relevant to the question of under what circumstances violent action is legally
justified as self-defense.”).
106. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
107. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
108. Id. at 942.
109. Id. at 935.
110. See Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth Century
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (articulating historical constitutional
understandings of the right to both the open and the concealed carry of firearms outside the home).
But see Young v. Hawaii, No. 12-17808, 2021 WL 1114180, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021) (en
banc) (holding that there is no unregulated right to carry firearms in public).
111. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
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criminal sanctions on their unlawful display.112 Despite the widening sphere
of protected activity, there has been to date no major constitutional challenge
to laws that criminalize conduct such as assault with a deadly weapon,
brandishing, or other threatening gun displays.113 The few cases thus far do
not suggest these laws are in constitutional jeopardy. For example, in Quigley
v. City of Huntington, 114 the court quickly rejected a claim that the state’s
brandishing statute violated the Second Amendment.115 Nor was the statute
unconstitutionally vague, because “[b]randishing a weapon is commonly
understood as holding or waiving a weapon in the presence of someone in an
intimidating manner.”116 Another federal court similarly rejected the claim
that a landowner’s displaying a weapon to warn her neighbor not to trespass
was protected conduct: “neither Heller nor McDonald forbids any State from
imposing reasonable restrictions on the use of weapons to eject or prevent
trespassers.”117 State courts interpreting their own constitutional arms-rights
provisions have likewise rejected challenges to these types of laws.118
B.

The Constitution’s Rhetorical Power and Expressive Effect

Laws regulating brandishing and similar conduct present no formal
conflict with the right to keep and bear arms—at least under Heller’s logic
and the lower courts’ jurisprudence to date. But the Second Amendment
supplies more than just a formal constitutional barrier to gun regulation; it
serves as a powerful rhetorical weapon. The Second Amendment is often
112. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois’ statewide
prohibition on public carry—the only such statewide law in the country). But see Darrell A.H.
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278,
1297 (2009) (arguing that a homebound right is consistent with Heller).
113. David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2010) (stating, in an article defending strong
gun rights, that criminalizing conduct such as brandishing a weapon “would not violate the Second
Amendment”). Cf. Reid Golden, Loaded Questions: A Suggested Constitutional Framework for the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2182, 2202 n.117 (2012) (arguing in favor of a
First Amendment framework for Second Amendment questions and stating: “Firing or even
brandishing a firearm in a public place, without the rare justification presented in a legitimate selfdefense scenario, is of course lawless and not an individual right within the meaning of the Second
Amendment.”).
114. No. 3:17-CV-1906, 2020 WL 1527792 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 30, 2020).
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id. at *6.
117. Saldinger v. Santa Cruz Cty. Super. Court, No. C 10-3147 SBA PR, 2010 WL 3339512,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010).
118. See Ex parte Poe, 491 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d) (“We
conclude that although there clearly are constitutional rights to bear arms and to express oneself
freely, there is no constitutionally protected right to display a firearm in a public place in a manner
that is calculated to alarm.”); State v. Spencer, 876 P.2d 939, 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting
challenge to law that “only prohibits the carrying or displaying of weapons when objective
circumstances would warrant alarm in a reasonable person”); State v. Daniel, 391 S.E.2d 90, 97
(W. Va. 1990) (rejecting constitutional challenge to brandishing statute).
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invoked by lawmakers—and understood by private actors—to protect guninvolved activities (including displays) that Heller would permit to be
regulated.119
Probably the most prominent constitutionally inflected criminal statutes
are the growing number of stand-your-ground laws. When Florida kicked off
the recent spike in such laws in 2004, its supporters—including most notably
the National Rifle Association—expressly invoked the constitutional right to
armed self-defense. As discussed above, stand-your-ground laws typically
eliminate the duty to retreat even when safe to do so, lower the bar to the use
of deadly force, and invert the normal rules of criminal defenses, putting the
onus on the state to disprove that the person was acting in reasonable selfdefense before even making an arrest.120 Advocates for such laws—and
sometimes the laws themselves—invoke the language of the right to armed
self-defense. By including a confusing “immunity” provision in its law, and
tying it to Second Amendment rights, Florida signaled its willingness to cloak
in constitutionally inflected language what might have formerly been
criminal conduct involving guns.
These laws have a tangible effect on citizens’ actions and responses.121
Take the case of Texan Joe Horn. In 2007, Horn shot and killed two men
stealing property from his neighbor’s home. Horn had seen the men
burglarizing the house and called 911 to report the theft. Despite the
emergency dispatcher’s admonition that he stay in his home and await police,
and that property theft is not worth shooting someone over, Horn insisted he
would not let the men get away. Citing a change in Texas’s self-defense law
just two months earlier, Horn declared: “the laws have been changed . . .
since September the first, and I have a right to protect myself.” He stepped
119. See, e.g., JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 3–4 (2018) (noting that political
and rhetorical discussions of the Second Amendment are often erroneously overbroad as compared
to current constitutional doctrine); Jacob D. Charles, Securing Gun Rights By Statute: The Right to
Keep and Bear Arms Outside the Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 1–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3789216 (charting the ways that
legislatures have invoked the Second Amendment to expand statutory protection for gun-related
conduct); Adam Winkler, Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?, 93 IND. L.J. 253, 253
(2018) (stating that “[t]here is a Judicial Second Amendment comprised of court decisions
interpreting the provision, and there is an Aspirational Second Amendment that is used in political
dialogue . . . ,” which “is far more hostile to gun laws than the judicial one,” “overtaking the Judicial
Second Amendment in American law”).
120. CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR
WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE 161–62 (2017).
121. See, e.g., Brandon W. Barnett, Misunderstanding Stand Your Ground and the Castle
Doctrine, OPEN CARRY TEX. (Jan. 20, 2016), https://opencarrytexas.wordpress.com/2016/01/20
/misunderstanding-stand-your-ground-and-the-castle-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/7L9B-6AHK]
(describing “a common misunderstanding” of stand-your-ground laws created by news reports is
that “the law grants the average citizen complete freedom to use any type of force, including deadly
force, as a self-help remedy, whenever one feels threatened”).
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out, confronted the men, and shot and killed them both, later saying “I had
no choice.” Police arrived just seconds later, but Horn was not arrested or
indicted by a grand jury that later evaluated the case, so there was never a
need for him to claim self-defense or invoke the state’s new stand-yourground law.122 But he apparently believed that the law authorized—maybe
even encouraged—him to initiate an armed confrontation, which ultimately
resulted in two deaths.
As Mary Anne Franks observes, the influence of stand-your-ground and
other similar laws “cannot be fully captured only by the outcomes of specific
cases.”123 The public imagination, shaped and informed by media reporting,
advocacy, and constitutional rhetoric, gives such laws a life beyond the four
corners of a statute.124 As in the killings by Horn and George Zimmerman,
“[t]he promotion of a shoot-first mentality has deadly consequences even if
individual defendants fail to raise or succeed on” such a defense in a
particular case.125 We might say the same for a mentality that focuses on the
prerogatives of public gun-bearers to the detriment of others. A brandish-first
mentality may be just as toxic because the mental barriers to such actions are
much lower than to pulling a trigger, but the trauma it inflicts and the chilling
effect it imparts can be real and lasting.
The St. Louis couple’s actions illustrate well this concern. When Circuit
Attorney Kimberly M. Gardner announced charges against the couple
displaying their guns to passing protestors in July 2020, she invoked the
state’s law criminalizing waving weapons in a threatening manner.126 “We
must protect the right to peacefully protest,” Gardner said, “and any attempt
to chill it through intimidation or threat of deadly force will not be
tolerated.”127 State Attorney General Eric Schmitt shot back, “this is a case
where the prosecutor contends that exercising the right to keep and bear arms

122. See Patrick Michels, Joe Horn and Five Years with the Texas Castle Doctrine, TEX.
OBSERVER (May 8, 2012, 7:29 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/joe-horn-and-castle-doctrineshootings-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/A32T-RX5S] (describing Joe Horn’s armed encounter with
burglars in his neighborhood).
123. MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 97 (2019).
124. See Pamela Cole Bell, Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and
Misunderstood, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 427 (2015) (criticizing opponents of stand-your-ground
laws for characterizing them as “shoot first” and “license to kill” laws and contending that “[c]ritics
who continue to make these deliberate misrepresentations run the risk of creating the very effect
they decry”).
125. FRANKS, supra note 123, at 97.
126. See Paybarah & Ortiz, supra note 5 (explaining that, according to the Circuit Attorney’s
Ofﬁce in St. Louis, exhibiting a semiautomatic rifle in “an angry or threatening manner” was
sufficient to charge Mark and Patricia McCloskey with unlawful use of a weapon).
127. Tom Jackman, St. Louis Couple Who Aimed Guns at Protesters Charged with Felony
Weapons Count, WASH. POST (July 20, 2020, 7:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/nation/2020/07/20/st-louis-couple-who-aimed-guns-protesters-charged-with-felony-weapons
-count/ [https://perma.cc/B22L-GSXA].
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in self-defense—one of Missouri’s most fundamental freedoms—is itself a
crime.”128 He explicitly connected the couple’s statutory and constitutional
rights. The “castle doctrine,” Schmitt wrote, “is not merely a creature of
statute, but is deeply rooted in—and implements—the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms” in the state constitution.129 And it need not be vindicated
in response to a criminal charge, he argued, because “[e]xhibiting a weapon
in an act of valid self-defense is not a crime at all.”130
The St. Louis case has echoes of a 2004 case in Florida that set off the
spread of stand-your-ground laws across the country. In that earlier Florida
case, a man who shot an intruder faced legal uncertainty for several months
as police investigated the incident.131 (They ultimately cleared him.)132
Lawmakers, however, were outraged at this state of legal limbo, and
concluded that only a blanket immunity from arrest, prosecution, and trial
would adequately protect the right of “law-abiding citizen[s]” to threaten,
display, and ultimately fire weapons when they perceive a threat.133
The Constitution’s role in the debate over laws criminalizing gunpointing is more expressive than doctrinal. There is nothing in the text,
history, judicial interpretation, or scholarly commentary concerning the
Second Amendment to suggest it prevents a state from outlawing brandishing
or assault with a deadly weapon. A self-defense exception might be
constitutionally required, but it is entirely possible such a defense would be
required without the Second Amendment.134 The rhetorical reliance on the
Second Amendment nonetheless imbues these arguments with powerful
symbolic force.
The central problem of the Second Amendment in this expressive sense
is that it has the potential to aggravate the risk of dangerous norm cascades
under the banner of a constitutional right. We have discussed how an optimal
equilibrium on gun display is unlikely given the behavioral data on how
individuals identify (and misidentify) threat and risk. And the machinery of
criminal law is not currently geared to arrest the slide into a sub-optimal
outcome or address the distributional effects of gun displays. Second
128. Amicus Brief of Attorney General Eric Schmitt Supporting Dismissal of the Case, at 4,
Missouri v. McCloskey, No. 2022-CR01300 (Mo. July 20, 2020).
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 10.
131. LIGHT, supra note 120, at 156–57.
132. Id. at 157.
133. Id.
134. See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1821 (2007) (arguing that, under Supreme Court
doctrine, “a right to self-defense (though potentially limitable by gun control laws) should be
recognized even without reliance on the Second Amendment”); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (stating in dicta that a right for a jury to consider self-defense may be
“fundamental”).
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Amendment politics seem to exacerbate the risks. Even if nothing prevents a
state from prohibiting, for example, guns at protests, the mere idea that the
Second Amendment not only permits but encourages their display can lead
to the very kind of lethal gun use that occurred in Austin and Kenosha, and
which the criminal law can only practically address after bullets have flown.
Conclusion
Existing criminal law is not up to the challenge of regulating gun
displays as they are increasingly practiced in public spaces in the United
States. The Second Amendment does not mandate this state of affairs as a
matter of legal doctrine, but does likely contribute—through its rhetorical and
expressive power—to broad misunderstandings about the legal status and
social value of gun displays. The more expansive the right to keep and bear
arms becomes, the more pressure it will place on the existing criminal law to
mitigate the costs of detrimental gun-related behavior—a task that it is not
currently equipped to do. For example, the more places persons have rights
to congregate with guns, the more public policy will have to rely on
menacing, breach of the peace, or criminal trespass. The greater the range of
the weapon, the more the law enforcement regime will have to lean on crimes
like terrorizing, inducing panic, or assault.
What, then, can be done?
One possibility is to revisit criminal rules and attempt to make them
clearer—not only so that people can feel more secure, but so that gun-bearers
can better understand the extent of their legal rights. Some of the
complications here are unavoidable, such as the need for a self-defense
exception and the attendant fact- and situation-specific inquiries into
reasonableness of threat perception, mens rea, and the like. But more brightline rules about when and how a gun can be employed in those situations
would certainly be desirable. Perhaps some lessons could be learned from
ongoing police reform efforts: While it is far from clear that there is anything
like a standard rule about when police officers can unholster their weapons,135
there have been efforts in the past to require such a rule,136 and the current
national debate about police violence might put such regulations back on the
agenda.
A second way to rein in undesirable gun displays would be to encourage
the role and power of private actors like business owners. It is notable, and
not surprising, that many reported gun displays happen in parking lots
135. Rhonda Fanning, Are There Rules for When Officers Unholster Their Firearms? Pt. 1,
TEX. STANDARD (Aug. 11, 2015, 10:47 AM), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/are-thererules-for-when-officers-unholster-their-firearms/ [https://perma.cc/V6VU-WXEE].
136. William K. Rashbaum, Police Will Review Policy on When to Draw Guns, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/31/nyregion/police-will-review-policy-onwhen-to-draw-guns.html [https://perma.cc/6MFK-G4TU].
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and stores—places where strangers come into contact with one another, and
tempers may flare. As private property owners are exempt from the Second
Amendment and largely free to set their own rules regarding firearms, 137
businesses and employers can—and many do—forbid the carrying of
weapons on their property. Indeed, an increasing number of prominent
retailers, from Walmart to Dick’s Sporting Goods, have announced gunrestrictive policies in recent years.138 This “private gun regulation” is among
the most important current developments shaping the practice of gun carrying
in the United States.
The third possibility—the most important and most difficult—is to wage
directly the battle over social norms with the objective of reaching a new and
safer equilibrium. Public debate about social practices, more than changes in
legal doctrine, has the potential to either normalize or limit the spread of
socially undesirable gun displays.139 That debate is playing out against a
complex mix of social forces, not all of them gun-specific. At a time when
anxiety is at unprecedented levels,140 gun sales are at all-time highs,141 fear
of others has eclipsed recreation and hunting as the primary reason for gun
ownership,142 and there is a concerted effort to expand the legality and
practice of open carry,143 the social expectations about when it is acceptable
to display a weapon are changing in complicated ways.

137. We say “largely” because some states do impose rules regarding signage and the like. See,
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.06–07 (West 2020).
138. See Dominic Rushe, Walmart and Dick’s Sporting Goods Put New Limits on Gun Sales,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/28/dickssporting-goods-guns-assault-rifle [https://perma.cc/L8AY-Q5DR].
139. Robert VerBruggen, Does Kyle Rittenhouse Have a Self-Defense Claim?, NAT’L REV.
(Aug. 28, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/08/does-kyle-rittenhouse-havea-self-defense-claim/ [https://perma.cc/CNL8-T337]. VerBruggen explained:
The outcome for each shooting will depend on whether Rittenhouse reasonably feared
for his life, which in turn might depend on broader context we lack thus far—and even
if all three shootings were justified, there are still firearms and reckless-endangerment
charges for him to contend with. Where the f*** were this kid’s parents?
Id.
140. Linda Searing, 60 Percent of U.S. Adults Are Feeling Daily Stress and Worry, New Gallup
Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/60percent-of-us-adults-are-feeling-daily-stress-and-worry-new-gallup-poll-shows/2020/04/17
/13ce9d8a-7ffd-11ea-a3ee-13e1ae0a3571_story.html [https://perma.cc/V6YX-4546].
141. Brakkton Booker, Amid Protests and Virus Fears, Firearm Background Checks Hit AllTime High, NPR (July 2, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-forracial-justice/2020/07/02/886545589/amid-virus-fears-and-protests-firearm-background-checkshit-all-time-high [https://perma.cc/BDV9-HSSK].
142. Art Swift, Personal Safety Top Reason Americans Own Guns Today, GALLUP (Oct. 28,
2013),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/165605/personal-safety-top-reason-americans-own-gunstoday.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JPY-JKKX] (“[T]hose who already own firearms mention personal
safety/protection most frequently as a reason for ownership (60%), followed by hunting, at 36%.”).
143. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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Of course, those social baselines are themselves shaped by law and how
officials use their discretion to enforce law, including the loosening of public
carry restrictions and the expansion of no-retreat self-defense rules that
privilege the use of guns and might—as in the case of Joe Horn—encourage
violent activity. Our point is that the social norms, shaped as they are by
public and private actors, may in turn have important implications for case
outcomes precisely because the applicable legal standards involve questions
like whether one person’s fear of another’s gun was “reasonable” in the
circumstances. The charging discretion of even the most careful enforcers, in
all but the clearest of cases, will inevitably be influenced by the social and
political forces bearing on virtually any case that has drawn media attention.
We are skeptical that the invisible hand of the market will lead to an
optimal or equitable equilibrium concerning gun displays.144 Absent a better
and more stable legal regime concerning gun display, the United States is
edging toward hazardous norm cascades with respect to public weaponry and
the realization of catastrophic tail risks with their presence in everyday life.
Law cannot be the ultimate solution in this story. But it needs updating, as a
brake on a gun-carrying society that feels, to many, more coarse and
menacing by the day.

144. See supra Part I; see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 119, at 151–59 (exploring the
notion of a Second Amendment “marketplace of violence” akin to the First Amendment’s
“marketplace of ideas”).

